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SENATOR EDMUND MUSKIE’S ENDURING
LEGACY IN THE COURTS
*

Richard J. Lazarus

More than any other legislator in the nation’s history, Senator Ed Muskie is
environmental law’s champion. Over forty years ago, Muskie helped secure
passage of an extraordinary series of ambitious and demanding air and water
pollution control laws that sought no less than to redefine the relationship of
humankind here in the United States to our natural environment. The upshot has
been the nation’s enjoyment, for more than four decades, of enormous economic
growth without the kind of accompanying environmental destruction witnessed
during the same time period in nations lacking such controls.
While President Richard Nixon is properly credited as playing a critical role
alongside Muskie in promoting tougher environmental laws,1 Nixon’s role is both
routinely overstated2 and best understood as yet another expression of Muskie’s
influence. Nixon can be fairly touted for creating the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and trumpeting, along with Muskie, passage of the federal Clean
Air Act,3 the nation’s first comprehensive pollution control law that imposed
sweeping and ambitious restrictions on emissions of air pollutants from motor
vehicles and stationary sources. What is too often forgotten is that Nixon’s
environmentalism was short-lived (lasting less than two years), was largely a
product of political posturing rather than personal ideology, and was clearly aimed
at undercutting Muskie’s prospects as Nixon’s Democratic opponent in the 1972
Presidential campaign.4 As soon as Nixon perceived there was less to be gained
politically in promoting environmental protection than by appealing to business

* Howard J. & Katherine W. Aibel Professor of Law Harvard Law School. This essay is based on
a talk I delivered on November 15, 2014, at the Edmund S. Muskie Centennial Celebration—
Connecting Law and Legislature: The Legacy of Senator Muskie, sponsored by the Maine Law Review.
I would like to thank Ryland Li and Anna Gunderson, both Harvard Law School Class of 2015 for their
assistance in the preparation of this essay: Mr. Li, for his outstanding research assistance in support of
the talk and this published essay, including the surveys of the number of references to Senator Muskie in
published opinions and Supreme Court oral arguments; and Ms. Gunderson, for her excellent editorial
assistance.
1. See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 76 (2004); J. BROOKS
FLIPPEN, NIXON AND THE ENVIRONMENT 227-28 (2000).
2. See, e.g., Michael D. Lemonick, Lost in Watergate’s Wake: Nixon’s Green Legacy, CLIMATE CENTRAL
BLOG (August 8, 2012), http://www.climatecentral.org/blogs/richard-nixon-the-environmentalist-resigned-38years-ago-today-14776 (the article mistakenly credits Nixon for Clean Water Act of 1972, which was enacted
only because Congress overrode the President’s veto).
3. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq.
4. LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 77; FLIPPEN, supra note 1, at 27 (“Nixon always had Muskie
on his mind.”) (quoting Russell Train, Nixon’s Chair of the Council on Environmental Quality).
The focus on Muskie is highlighted by how, according to Nixon’s Chief of Staff, H.R.
Haldeman, Nixon on July 23, 1971, concluded that emphasizing “economics and the economy”
was “more important than undercutting Muskie” on the environment. See H.R. Haldeman, H. R.
Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973, National Archives and Records
Administration,
http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/virtuallibrary/documents/haldeman-diaries/37hrhd-audiocassette-ac11ab-19710723-pa.pdf.
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interests opposed to those efforts, the President did a quick about-face.5 Nixon at
first acted quietly behind the scenes to work against tougher pollution control
limitations. But then he became more public, culminating in his veto of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.
While Muskie’s Congress represents lawmaking at its best, Congress since
1990 has been the exact opposite: Congress at its worst.6 The spirit of
bipartisanship and constructive compromise that Muskie fostered and that was
crucial to his success has since collapsed. While we once had environmental law
because of Congress, we now have environmental law without Congress.7 In the
absence of any new, significant environmental legislation, the United States EPA’s
only recourse is to address today’s pressing environmental problems with statutory
language drafted by lawmakers almost a half-century ago with very different
problems in mind.8 Although that language has proven remarkably durable, the
EPA faces considerable barriers in litigation challenging its efforts. And nowhere is
that challenge more apparent than in EPA’s current efforts to apply the existing
Clean Air Act to address climate change.
The purpose of this paper is to focus on Muskie’s enduring legacy in federal
court litigation in which EPA has defended its implementation of the laws that
Muskie championed. To that end, this article is divided into two parts: Part I
generally describes the remarkable extent to which judges have sought to determine
Muskie’s views on a particular issue in deciding whether EPA’s actions are
consistent with congressional intent. Senator Muskie has not served in the Senate
since 1980, yet judges and advocates today continue to debate Muskie’s views in
determining the legality of EPA actions. Part II focuses more specifically on
EPA’s current efforts to invoke its Clean Air Act authorities to address the
worldwide threat of climate change. What EPA’s most recent final and proposed
rulemakings make clear, especially in light of the litigation launched to challenge
those rulemakings, is Muskie’s continuing relevance today as the nation continues
to depend on the statutes he championed to address our most pressing
environmental problems.
I. SENATOR MUSKIE IN THE COURTS
The settled touchstone for determining the meaning of statutory language is
congressional intent. Where Congress has enacted language with “plain meaning,”
the Supreme Court has long made clear that the judicial presumption must be that
Congress intended that plain meaning to control.9 And neither the judicial branch
nor an agency responsible for administering the statute can overcome the plain
meaning of that statutory language. But, where Congress has instead enacted
language the meaning of which is ambiguous, then the courts must defer to the
5. LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 77-78.
6. See generally Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative
Democracy in Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619 (2006).
7. Richard Lazarus, Environmental Law Without Congress, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. __
(forthcoming 2015).
8. See generally Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L.
REV. 1 (2014).
9. Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
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reasonable interpretation of the agency charged by Congress with its
administration, so long as that agency is acting pursuant to its legislatively
delegated lawmaking authority.10
For federal environmental law, however, a review of the case law suggests the
possible propriety of placing an asterisk at the conclusion of any such hornbook
statement of administrative law, offering the following caveat: Congressional
intent in the context of federal environmental law may be fairly equated with the
intent of Senator Ed Muskie of Maine. Federal courts in their opinions have cited
to the views of Senator Muskie in the enactment of federal environmental statutes
in at least 293 separate cases.11 That is an enormous number of cases. The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has itself cited to Muskie’s
views in fifty-four cases.12 And, the D.C. Circuit of course is the nation’s most
important court for federal environmental law because it has original jurisdiction to
hear challenges to EPA rules promulgated under a host of federal environmental
laws, including the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts,13 and exclusive jurisdiction to
consider some of those challenges.14
Looking just to the United States Supreme Court, the statistics are even more
striking. The Justices have cited to Muskie in twenty-two different cases.15 They
include eight Clean Air Act cases,16 and eleven Clean Water Act cases.17 For each

10. United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
11. The number of federal court citations to the Senator, D.C. Circuit citations, and Supreme Court
citations is based on a Westlaw Next search conducted of all federal court cases as of October 7, 2014.
12. See supra note 11.
13. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857(b)(1).
14. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857(b)(1) (providing D.C. Circuit with exclusive jurisdiction to
review validity of certain EPA rules).
15. See Train v. New York, 420 U.S. 35, 48 & n.14 (1975); Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
421 U.S. 60, 84-85 (1975); Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Grp., Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 14 (1976);
Union Elec. Co. v. E.P.A., 427 U.S. 246, 258-59 (1976); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430
U.S. 112, 129 (1977); Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 296 (1978) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting); Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 599 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); E.P.A. v.
Nat’l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 71 n.10 (1980); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304,
329 (1981); id. at 344 n.16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea
Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 17 n.27 (1981); Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
862 (1984); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 129 & n.19 (1985); id.
at 140, 150, 155, 157, 162, 163 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 366
(1986); Tull v. U.S., 481 U.S. 412, 422 (1987); id. at 424 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 61 (1987); Robertson v. Methow Valley
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989); Hallstrom v. Tillamook Cnty, 493 U.S. 20, 28 (1989);
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 490 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring in part &
concurring in the judgment); Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 261
(2004) (Souter, J., dissenting); S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 386 (2006);
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 231-32 (2009) (Breyer, J., concurring in part &
dissenting in part); id. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A., 134 S. Ct.
2427, 2453 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
16. See Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975); Union Elec. v. E.P.A., 427
U.S. 246 (1976); Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275 (1978); Chevron v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578 (1980); Whitman v.
Am. Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt.
Dist., 541 U.S. 246 (2004); Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A., 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
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of those laws, that number constitutes a large percentage of Clean Air and Clean
Water Act cases decided by the Court.
The Senator, moreover, was cited most often by the Court majority in those
cases, meaning that his views literally influenced the reasoning underlying the
Court’s ruling. Seventeen different majority opinions cited to Muskie.18 On ten
occasions, Muskie’s views were cited by separate opinions, either dissenting or
concurring in whole or in part from the majority.19 The Justices referred to the
Senator as “the principal Senate sponsor” and the “primary author” of federal
environmental legislation.20
Not surprisingly, the vast majority of those Supreme Court citations occurred
in environmental cases decided between 1975 and 1989, either while Muskie was
in the Senate, or after he left the Senate in 1980 to become Secretary of State and
was still a prominent national figure closely identified with the still-then-recentlyenacted laws at issue in the cases. That first period accounts for seventeen of the
twenty-two Supreme Court cases.21 What is more surprising, and ultimately more
telling, is that although the Court did not cite to Muskie in any environmental case
decided between 1990 and 2000, the Court has since cited to Muskie in five cases,

17. See Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975); Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research
Grp., Inc., 426 U.S. 1 (1976); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977); E.P.A. v.
Nat’l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64 (1980); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981);
Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116 (1985); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987);
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987); S.D. Warren Co. v.
Maine Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370 (2006); Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208
(2009).
18. See Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 48 & n.14 (1975); Train v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 84-85 (1975); Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Grp., 426 U.S. 1, 14
(1976); Union Elec. Co. v. E.P.A., 427 U.S. 246, 258-59 (1976); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
Train, 430 U.S. 112, 129 (1977); E.P.A. v. Nat’l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 71 n.10 (1980);
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 329 (1981); Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea
Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 17 n.27 (1981); Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
862 (1984); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 129 & n.19 (1985);
Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 366 (1986); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422 (1987);
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 61 (1987); Robertson v.
Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989); Hallstrom v. Tillamook Cnty., 493 U.S. 20,
28 (1989); S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 386 (2006).
19. See Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 296 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting);
Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 599 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); City of Milwaukee v.
Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 344 n.16 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 140, 150, 155, 157, 162, 163 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Tull v.
United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Whitman v. Am. Trucking
Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 490 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment);
Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 261 (2004) (Souter, J.,
dissenting); Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 231-32 (2009) (Breyer, J., concurring in
part & dissenting in part); id. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A., 134 S.
Ct. 2427, 2453 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
20. See, E.P.A. v. Nat’l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 71 n.10 (1980) (“the principal Senate
sponsor”); Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Grp., Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 14 (1984) (“the FWPCA’s
primary author”); see also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 129 (1977) (“perhaps
the Act’s primary author”).
21. See supra note 5.
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including as recently as June 2014,22 thereby underscoring Muskie’s continuing
influence as an accepted authority decades after he left the Senate.
To be sure, it is clear that certain Justices look to Muskie as an authority more
than others, and one can accurately predict that a Justice such as Antonin Scalia,
who famously decries any reliance on legislative history, has not cited to the
Senator on even one occasion. But, putting Scalia’s distinct views aside and
acknowledging some ideological skewing in the identity of those citing Muskie as
authority, it is still clear that the Senator’s influence cuts across a wide spectrum of
views on the bench. The Justices who cited Muskie the most in their opinions
extend beyond more liberal Justices such as Thurgood Marshall (six),23 John Paul
Stevens (four),24 and Stephen Breyer (three),25 to include Chief Justice William
Rehnquist (three),26 and Justice Byron White (three).27
In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois,28 for example, the majority and dissenting
opinions referred to Muskie by name seventeen times in debating whether the
Clean Water Act displaced federal common law remedies for water pollution. The
two opinions engaged in a lengthy and prolonged debate over the meaning of
remarks made by Muskie during the passage of that Act. The dissent stressed that
the “Court previously has observed that Senator Muskie was perhaps the Act’s
primary author, and has credited his views accordingly.”29 The majority responded
that the dissent had mischaracterized what Muskie had said and that the dissent’s
inaccuracy “appears to be of no little importance.”30 In short, the Justices may
disagree on the meaning of federal environmental statutes in application in
individual cases, but they tend to share one common premise: Senator Muskie’s
views matter.
Finally, the oral arguments before the Court similarly highlight the extent to
which Muskie’s views are considered weighty legal authority. During oral
argument, an attorney has limited time to put forth her arguments, especially
considering the many questions posed by the bench. There is time only for the best
and potentially most persuasive points; an attorney must identify the critical issues
22. See supra note 5.
23. See Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Grp., 426 U.S. 1, 14 (1984); Union Elec. Co. v.
E.P.A., 427 U.S. 246, 258-59 (1976); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 470 U.S. 116,
140, 150, 155, 157, 162, 163 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 366
(1986); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 61 (1987).
24. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 129 (1977); Chevron v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 862 (1984); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S.
332, 349 (1989); Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 243 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
25. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 490 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring in
part & concurring in the judgment); Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 231-32 (2009)
(Breyer, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part); id. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Util. Air
Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A., 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2453 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
26. See Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 84-85 (1975); Harrison v. PPG Indus.,
Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 599 (1980); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 329 (1981).
27. See Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 48 & n.14 (1975); E.P.A. v. Nat’l Crushed Stone
Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 71 n.10 (1980); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 470 U.S. 116, 129
& n.19 (1985).
28. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
29. Id. at 344 n.16.
30. Id. at 331 n.23.
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and address only the legal authority most likely to persuade the Justices in favor of
her argument or distinguish those arguments that are detrimental to her case. Yet,
even in these limited circumstances, counsel arguing before the Court referred to
Muskie on thirty-four occasions,31 with most of those references occurring in five
cases.32
Justice Breyer, who famously believes in the relevance of legislative history as
much as Justice Scalia does not, has been Muskie’s great champion at oral
argument. Breyer has referred to Muskie’s views, including specific quotes from
the legislative record, six times in two cases.33 And, even that number understates
the weight the Justice clearly assigns to Muskie’s views. For instance, during oral
argument in Entergy v. Riverkeeper,34 Breyer repeatedly questioned counsel for
petitioner and respondent on Muskie’s views, quoting from statements made by the
Senator during the 1972 Clean Water Act debates:
So I go back to page 170 of the legislative history, which I have read now six
times, and I agree with you that it is not totally clear. Maybe you think it is. But it
seems to me what he is saying there is just what you’ve said: Don’t go into this
with some elaborate thing, but remember costs are still relevant. And what I’ve
been searching for throughout is a set of words that would help me translate that
35
thought into a legal reality.

Indeed, Justice Breyer’s treatment of Senator Muskie as authority is so deep
that it apparently extends to the staff who worked for the Senator. In the Court’s
major Clean Air Act greenhouse gas ruling in June, 2014, Utility Air Regulatory
Group v. EPA,36 Breyer mused about what the language and history of the bill
suggested in terms of congressional intent. And, in raising that issue with arguing
31. This number is based on my research assistant’s review in October 2014 of Supreme Court oral
argument transcripts available at www.oyez.org.
32. See Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Grp., Inc. (arguing counsel referred to Muskie
eleven times); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (five times); Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council (four
times by both Court and counsel); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. (one time);
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc. (nine times for both the Court and counsel). Transcript of Oral
Argument at 5-6, 8, 11, 12, 13-14, Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Grp., Inc., 426 U.S. 1
(1976) (No. 74-1270), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1975/1975_74_1270;
Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, 19, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (No. 79-408),
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1980/1980_79_408; Transcript of Oral Argument at
8, 12-13, Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (Nos. 82-1005, 82-1247, and
82-1591), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1983/1983_82_1005; Transcript of Oral
Argument at 11, Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116 (1985) (Nos.
83-1013 and 83-1373), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1984/1984_83_1013;
Transcript of Oral Argument at 20-21, 43-45, 51, 60-61, Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S.
208 (2009) (Nos. 07-588, 07-589, and 07-597).
33. Justice Breyer referred to Muskie five times during the argument in Entergy Corp. v.
Riverkeeper, Inc., and once during the argument in Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A.. Transcript of
Oral Argument at 20-21, 43, 51, 61, Entergy Corp., 556 U.S. 208 (Nos. 07-588, 07-589, and 07-597);
Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A., 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014) (Nos.
12-1146, 12-1248, 12-1254, 12-1268, 12-1269, and 12-1272).
34. 556 U.S. 208 (2009). This author was the arguing counsel for respondent Riverkeeper in this
case.
35. Transcript of Oral Argument at 43-44, Entergy Corp., 556 U.S. 208 (Nos. 07-588, 07-589, and
07-597).
36. 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
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counsel, the Justice referred not only to Muskie, but explicitly to his chief staffer
for the bill, Leon Billings.37 No longer were the Justices solely pondering, as they
have now for decades of environmental litigation: what did Senator Muskie think?
At least for Justice Breyer, the scope of inquiry has expanded to include the
question: what did Leon Billings think?
II. SENATOR MUSKIE’S ENDURING LEGACY IN CLIMATE LITIGATION TODAY
Greenhouse gas emissions and climate change are the nation’s, and the
planet’s, most pressing and most difficult environmental problems. As stressed by
the most recent report issued by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), “[c]ontinued emission of greenhouse gases will cause
further warming and long-lasting changes in all components of the climate system,
increasing the likelihood of severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts for people
and ecosystems.”38 Nor did the IPCC, in its most dire statement ever of the
environmental consequences of continued failure to curtail greenhouse gas
emissions, express doubt concerning the role that human activities have played, and
will continue to play, in contributing to dangerous concentrations of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere, absent dramatic change: “[H]uman influence . . . is
extremely likely to have been the dominant cause of the observed warming since
the mid-20th century.”39
Yet, because the associated political obstacles of enacting national climate
legislation have so far proven overwhelming, EPA has been relegated to relying on
the statutory authorities set forth in Muskie’s Clean Air Act legislation, first
comprehensively enacted in 1970 and since amended, including under Muskie’s
watchful eye, in 1977. In Massachusetts v. EPA,40 the Supreme Court’s first major
climate case, decided in 2006, the Court relied on the Act’s “capacious” definition
of “air pollutant” in rejecting EPA’s then-view that the Agency lacked authority to
address climate change under the Clean Air Act.41 The Court acknowledged that
Muskie’s Congress no doubt had enacted the relevant language without the climate
issue in mind, but by drafting language of deliberate breadth, Congress had
nonetheless fairly authorized EPA to address issues, like climate change, that arose
in the future.42 The Court’s more recent ruling in Utility Air Regulatory Group v.
EPA,43 decided June 2014, is to similar effect. Building upon Massachusetts v.
EPA, the Court held that the Prevention of Significant Deterioration Program,
added to the Clean Air Act under Muskie’s stewardship in 1977, further authorized
EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new and modified major stationary
37. Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. 2427 (Nos. 12-1146,
12-1248, 12-1254, 12-1268, 12-1269, and 12-1272) (“I get that answer on the language there. But if
you had been sitting in Congress and the Senate, Mr. Billings, I think is the staff person, Senator
Muskie, and suppose that you had this choice put to you with your language.”).
38. INTERGOV’TL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014, FIFTH ASSESSMENT SYNTHESIS
REPORT 8 (November 5, 2014), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full.pdf.
39. Id. at 47 (emphasis in original).
40. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
41. Id. at 532.
42. Id.
43. 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
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sources that were already subject to regulation under that Program.44
EPA’s most important climate change related challenge, however, is yet to
come, and it is likely that Senator Muskie’s handiwork, and intent, will once again
be front and center. Entirely missing from EPA’s greenhouse gas regulations to
date has been regulation of the nation’s existing fossil fuel electric generating units,
which are the single largest source of greenhouse gas emissions. In 2012, the
production of electricity was the largest single source of total U.S. greenhouse gas
emissions, and coal combustion from existing power plants was responsible for the
vast majority of those emissions.45
In June 2014, however, EPA published for the first time a proposed set of rules
under the Clean Air Act aimed at sharply reducing greenhouse gas emissions from
existing power plants.46 EPA seeks to leverage its mostly untapped authority over
existing stationary sources of air pollutants that endanger public health and welfare
to prompt the States to undertake a series of steps—dubbed “building blocks” by
EPA’s rulemaking—to reduce existing power plant greenhouse emissions by thirty
percent in 2030 from 2005 levels.47 These steps include increased coal combustion
efficiency, decreasing the hours that coal combustion units are used by offloading
demand to existing non-coal units with lower greenhouse gas emissions and
available excess capacity, increasing the electricity production capacity of
renewable sources of power such as wind and solar, and decreasing consumer
demand for electricity with more efficient buildings, homes, appliances, and
individual behavior.48
The ambition, reach, and creativity of the proposed regulations are undeniable.
What is still an open question is their legality. Because Congress has failed to
enact new, comprehensive climate legislation, EPA’s authority is limited to what is
available under the existing Clean Air Act, in particular Section 111(d) of that
Act.49 EPA will need to persuade the reviewing courts that although Congress did
not have these kinds of greenhouse gas control measures in mind in enacting the
relevant statutory language, the language is nonetheless, as in Massachusetts v.
EPA, sufficiently capacious to authorize EPA’s regulations. Because, moreover,
much of the relevant statutory language within Section 111(d) that will determine
whether EPA’s regulations pass judicial muster originated with Senator Muskie’s
Public Works Committee, the Senator will once again likely be front and center in
the litigation.
For example, EPA’s proposed rulemaking raises a host of legal questions
under Section 111(d), but a central linchpin of EPA’s proposal is that the “best
system of emission reduction,” within the meaning of Section 111,50 is not limited

44. Id. at 2446-49.
45. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 19902012, ES8-ES10 (April 15, 2014), http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghg emissions/US-GHGInventory-2014-Main-Text.pdf.
46. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830, 34,830 (June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R pt. 60).
47. Id. at 34,832, 34,855-56.
48. See generally id. at 34,856-78.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2013).
50. Clean Air Act § 111(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2013).
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to those that can be achieved by on-site emission controls imposed on a facility.
The agency contends that the statutory reference to “system” allows EPA to
consider the further possibility of actions taken off-site that are capable of reducing
the very need for the facility’s operation. In other words, the “system” of emission
reduction, according to EPA, includes the possibility of the facility reducing its
hours of operation or closing altogether because the need that had historically been
met by a facility with high greenhouse gas emissions can be met by other facilities
with lower emissions rates or by decreasing consumer electricity demand.51
EPA’s theory has an obvious, commonsense appeal that can be squared with
an expansive definition of the plain meaning of the word “system.” Looking to The
Oxford Dictionary of English, the agency relies on a “broad” definition of the term
“system”: “a set of things working together as parts of a mechanism or
interconnecting network; a complex whole.”52 EPA further argues that the clear
import of that plain meaning is that “the ‘system of emission reduction’ may
include anything that reduces emissions” for those sources.53
But, it is also clear that such a view constitutes a significant expansion of EPA
authority far beyond that which the agency has historically claimed under the Clean
Air Act, let alone under Section 111(d). To be sure, EPA has previously allowed
sources to comply with pollution control standards by relying on a host of
measures, including such off-site activities. EPA, however, has never before used
those measures as the basis for determining the degree of control achievable in the
first instance. For EPA, that may be a distinction without a legal difference;
industry, however, will likely make clear in litigation that they view the difference
as fatal to EPA’s claim of authority.
Nor is EPA’s claim that “reduced generation” is a “system of emission
reduction” an incidental part of its rulemaking proposal. Just the opposite. The
vast majority of reductions in greenhouse gas emissions contemplated by EPA’s
proposal turn on whether EPA is correct. While the precise percentages of
greenhouse gas emission reductions achievable by the various “building blocks”
described above varies by State, for all States the amount of reductions achievable
by reduction of demand for electricity produced by high carbon emitting, coal
combustion facilities is less than one quarter of the total emission reductions EPA
believes to be achievable by the proposed rule, and for most States it is far lower
than that.54 For this reason, the success of EPA’s ambitious rulemaking is very
much dependent on whether the agency can persuade the courts that Section
111(d)’s language is sufficiently broad to support the agency’s interpretation of its
sweep.

51. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Legal Memorandum for Proposed Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines
50-54
(June
2014),
for
Existing
Electric
Utility
Generating
Units
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-06/documents/20140602-legal-memorandum.pdf [hereinafter
EPA Legal Memorandum].
52. Id. at 51 & n.42 (citation omitted).
53. Id. at 51-52.
54. THE BRATTLE GRP., EPA’S CLEAN POWER PLAN – BASICS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED CO2
EMISSIONS STANDARDS ON EXISTING FOSSIL UNITS UNDER CAA SECTION 111(D) 6 (Aug. 12, 2014),
http://www.brattle.com/system/publications/pdfs/000/005/067/original/EPA%27s_Clean_Power_Plan_Newell_
GS_PUMP_Conference_081214.pdf?1408040470.
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And this is where Senator Muskie, once again, becomes front and center. In
support of its interpretation, EPA repeatedly turns to Senator Muskie in both its
proposed rulemaking and in its accompanying “Legal Memorandum.” EPA twice
expressly refers to statements made by the Senator in its proposed rulemaking, and
adds five such references in that accompanying memorandum.55 Each of the
references relates to this same core issue: the Agency’s claim that reduced
generation is within the scope of a “system of emission reduction.”
In the preamble to the proposed regulations, EPA cites to statements made by
Senator Muskie in support of its contention that “the legislative history of the 1970
amendments indicates that Congress recognized that emitting sources could comply
with pollution control requirements by reducing production, including retiring.”56
Relying on further statements by the Senator, EPA states in its Legal Memorandum
that “Congress has recognized” that parts of the Act depend on industrial sources
“retiring” in order to attain the Clean Air Act’s pollution control standards.57
Pointing to another Muskie statement, EPA similarly argues that the Senator’s
discussion of how cities might meet pollution standards by “restrict[ing]” the “use
of motor vehicles” within their borders further buttresses the Agency’s view of the
propriety of taking such emission reduction measures into account in Section
111(d).58 Finally, quoting Muskie yet one more time, EPA proffers as evidence
that Congress clearly understood that reduction of a source’s operation was within
the scope of control measures the Senator’s statement that “standards could be
sufficiently stringent so that ‘effectively . . . a plant would be required to close
because of the absence of control techniques.’”59 According to EPA, “Congress’s
recognition that closing plants is a method of reducing pollution necessarily
encompasses reduced utilization as a system of reducing pollution.”60 What is
most telling is that in all of these examples, EPA is essentially treating statements
by Senator Muskie as tantamount to congressional intent and knowledge. The two
are effectively conflated for the purposes of legal argument. “Congress” is
“Muskie.”
III. CONCLUSION
Senator Muskie’s environmental law legacy is no less than stunning in terms
of positive impact on the nation’s natural environment. It takes little imagination to
speculate what our national landscape would now look like if the economic growth
we witnessed in the past four decades had not been accompanied by the
environmental protections for air, land, and water provided by the laws that Senator
Muskie championed in the 1970s. All one has to do is look to the environmental
devastation that has been inflicted on other parts of the globe, such as in parts of
55. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, supra note 46, at 34889 n.240; EPA Legal Memorandum, supra note 51, at 82 &
nn.64 & 66.
56. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, supra note 46, at 34889 & n.240.
57. EPA Legal Memorandum, supra note 51, at 81-82 & n.64.
58. EPA Legal Memorandum, supra note 51, at 82 n.64.
59. EPA Legal Memorandum, supra note 51, at 82 & n.66.
60. EPA Legal Memorandum, supra note 51, at 83.
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eastern Europe and Asia, where dramatic economic growth and industrialization
occurred over the same time period without comparable environmental protection
safeguards.
What is equally remarkable is the enduring nature of Senator Muskie’s
contributions. Decades after their first enactment, the basic legal architecture that
the Senator and his staffers like Leon Billings constructed remains largely in place.
Repeated efforts to dismantle the architecture, launched sometimes by members of
Congress and other times within the executive branch, have largely failed. And,
even though Congress for decades has largely absented itself from environmental
lawmaking, Muskie’s voice can still be heard in the federal courts decades after he
departed those legislative chambers. His voice is expressed in the arguments made
by lawyers, and in the judicial rulings themselves, extending to the United States
Supreme Court.
The current debate over EPA’s authority to address climate change under
existing laws tells the same story. The legal stakes for EPA in defending the
legality of the Clean Power Plan are huge. And, the legal arguments that EPA must
make in litigation are far from slam-dunks in favor of the Agency. But, EPA
knows that when the going gets tough, it can rarely do better than to rely on
environmental law’s true champion: Mr. Clean, the Senator from Maine, Ed
Muskie.

